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1  Introduction 
In order to combat recent and future issues concerning the changing electricity system, the creation 
of a European wide electricity market was proposed in 2009. However, only focusing on the wholesale 
market, where electricity itself is exchanged, will not ensure an efficient system [1]. Therefore, the 
markets for ancillary services are also considered. These ancillary services consist of activities such as 
voltage control and frequency control (i.e. balancing reserves). The goal was to couple all these 
markets across Europe to achieve a more efficient electricity market, in rule with the Third Energy 
package proposed by the EU with the help of a new organisation, the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E)  [2]. 
However, the implementation has not progressed equally for all markets. For the wholesale market, 
countries have harmonised their different markets so that cross-border exchange is a valuable part of 
the market. These markets are organised according to their respective region such as Central Western 
Europe or Northern Europe [3]. For the balancing markets, this implementation is lagging because 
current balancing markets differentiate on aspects such as gate closure times, minimum up times and 
load participation. Therefore, ENTSO-E made harmonisation of these markets an important target [4]. 
There are several reasons why a harmonised balancing market is important. This will increase benefits 
for both Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and society as the number of suppliers increase, which 
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in turn increases competition and reduces prices [5], [6]. Furthermore, a larger number of suppliers 
will also enhance operational security [6]. 
This paper studies how the imbalance market is influenced by the availability of interconnection 
capacity. By reserving capacity upfront, there is an increase in imbalance netting potential and thus in 
cost savings from reducing the need to activate balancing reserves. Furthermore, reliability limits 
currently imposed on cross-border balancing exchanges further hamper the potential of imbalance 
netting. The importance of this limit is also studied in this paper. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the balancing market organisation. Section 
3 explains what imbalance netting is and how this works. Section 4 explains the model that is used to 
research this. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes this paper and gives suggestions for 
future work. 
2  Balancing market organisation 
2.1  Balancing phases 
There are three phases in the balancing market structure [7]. First, each TSO calculates the amount of 
reserves that are needed. This depends on the type of products and the specifics of the country. E.g. 
on the one hand, for Frequency Containment Reserves (FCR), the sizing is coordinated by ENTSO-E so 
the TSOs themselves are not responsible for this. On the other hand, not every country is required to 
size, and procure, Replacement Reserves (RR) [8]. This explains why reserve needs differ across Europe: 
some countries focus on Automatic Frequency Restoration Reserves (aFRR) for most of their needs, 
others use Manual Frequency Restoration Reserves (mFRR) [9]. An explanation of these products 
follows in Section 2.2  
Second, the reserves sized in the first step are procured on the market. This procurement makes sure 
that reserves will be available to be activated if necessary, they are in stand-by mode. Most reserves 
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get a reservation price, which is based on the amount of capacity that is reserved, regardless of 
eventual activation. This procurement step is different for most countries as all the markets differ from 
each other. Furthermore, the frequency of the procurements also differ: this can go from weekly to 
annual [10]. 
Third and last, the reserves that were procured can be activated if necessary in real-time. When 
activated, these reserves get an activation price that is based on the energy that they delivered. Two 
activation schemes are used: pro-rata and merit order. With pro-rata, all the contracted reserves are 
activated, regardless of their activation price. However, they are only activated pro-rata their share in 
the total amount of procured reserves. In this way, all available ramping speed is used [9]. For merit 
order, the reserves are activated according to a merit order scheme where the cheapest ones, in terms 
of activation price, are activated first [9]. 
During this last phase, there is a strict sequence in how the reserves are activated. First, imbalance 
netting is evaluated. This will be further explained in Section 3 . Second, only after the possibilities of 
imbalance netting are exhausted, the other options of activating aFRR and, if necessary, activating 
mFRR are used. 
2.2  Balancing products 
To maintain the balance between production and consumption, and thus the frequency, in an electrical 
system, TSOs can choose from four different kind of products: FCR, aFRR, mFRR and RR (see Figure 1) 
[4], [11]. 
FCR, previously called primary reserves, are the first line of defence against frequency deviations. They 
have to stabilise these deviations almost immediately to make sure that the problem is contained, 
hence their name. Not surprisingly, the reaction times are very short (i.e. 15 seconds) [10]. 
FRR have the goal of relieving FCR from their task in order for them to be freed up to counter new 
deviations. First, the aFRR, or secondary reserves, are activated. If these cannot restore the balance, 
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the TSO sends out a signal to the suppliers to inform them to manually activate their mFRR (tertiary 
reserves). The reaction times of this product differ between countries but are commonly below 15 
minutes [10].  
RR are the last option for TSOs to balance the system with reserve products. These will be activated in 
case of major disturbances in order to relieve aFRR after 15 minutes so that they are ready for further 
frequency deviations [12]. 
 
Figure 1 Overview of balancing products [13] 
2.3  International Grid Control Cooperation 
Several projects of balancing market integration are already present in Europe [14].  For FCR, which is 
already sized European wide, a large coordinated market is present in Western Europe (Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria) with more countries (France and Denmark) to follow 
[15], [16]. Furthermore, imbalance netting is in place thanks to the International Grid Control 
Cooperation (IGCC) [17]. 
IGCC started as a cooperation between the four German TSOs in order to optimise the activation of 
aFRR [18]. Since 2011, this cooperation has extended to foreign TSOs in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Belgium, Austria and France. The development consists of four 




1. Preventing counteracting balancing energy activation 
If two neighbouring control areas have imbalance volumes in opposite directions, the respective TSOs 
can choose to exchange these volumes with each other. This will reduce the amount of total imbalance 
volumes in the system. This results in not only fewer reserves to be activated, but also a reduction of 
the moments where neighbouring TSOs activate aFRR in opposite directions, which is a clear point of 
inefficiency [8]. This is also called imbalance netting and is further explained in Section 3  
2. Common dimensioning of control reserve 
In this module, TSOs will cooperate in the first phase of the balancing market. Instead of only taking 
their own control area into account to size their reserves, TSOs will work together to size reserves for 
the combined control area of all cooperating TSOs. Thanks to pooling effects, the overall amount of 
required reserves will decrease, which also reduces costs [20].  
3. Common procurement of aFRR 
Related to the second phase of the balancing market, TSOs will not only size their reserves in 
cooperation with each other but also procure these together. However, for this phase to be successful, 
a decent harmonisation of these markets is necessary as balancing products may not be able to enter 
every market due to differences in characteristics. Two approaches are possible for this procurement. 
First, TSO-BSP (Balance Service Provider) trading occurs when BSPs from one country exchange their 
reserve products directly with the TSO of another country, without interactions with their own TSO. 
Second, with the TSO-TSO model, BSPs only interact with their own TSO, who in turn will exchange 
reserves with the other TSO [20], [21].  
4. Cost-optimised activation of balancing energy 
In last module, related to the activation phase, TSOs will coordinate the activation of their reserves 
according to a harmonised activation scheme. An example for this is a common merit order list where 
bids from all connected TSOs are put on a common platform, after which the market is cleared [22]. 
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It is clear that the last three modules occur in the same order as the phases of the balancing market 
explained in 2.1. Currently, all considered countries take part in module 1. The other modules are less 
implemented but also important e.g. the cooperation between Belgium and the Netherlands for cross-
border exchange of aFRR and mFRR [23]. 
3  Imbalance netting opportunity 
To apply imbalance netting, first the netting potential has to be calculated, which can be done every 
second [18]. This is the amount of imbalance volumes that can be exchanged cross-border and is the 
minimisation of the following three terms. First, for imbalance netting to occur, the imbalance 
volumes, i.e. the difference between production and demand at a specific time, for both control areas, 
should have opposite directions. This means that when one TSO has too much production (or demand), 
the other TSO will have too much demand (or production) and thus this can be evened out. Of course, 
only the minimum of these imbalance volumes can be netted [18]. 
Second, there is a limit for the exchange for IGCC due to reliability requirements. This limit is 
approximately equal to the aFRR that is procured nationally and thus is different for each country [18].  
Third, the interconnection capacity has to be available for netting to occur. This capacity is first 
allocated to the wholesale electricity markets (long term, day-ahead and intraday). However, there is 
no allocation mechanism for the balancing markets at present [8], [18]. So only when there is still 
capacity left after the wholesale market, this can be used for imbalance netting. However, it is not 
certain upfront if any capacity will be available, which hampers the balancing market both in short 
term, by not being able to net the imbalances, and in long term, by procuring too much locally to 
guarantee the availability of reserves.  
Two options can be considered for the interconnection capacity. First, the Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) 
is the theoretical maximum, taking into account safety limits, of interconnection capacity that can be 
exchanged between control areas [24]. However, as this is the maximum before any exchange on the 
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wholesale markets take place, this is not the most realistic option. Although, due to its simplicity, this 
can be a valid choice for interconnection values [7]. A second option is to take a Flow-Based Market 
Coupling (FMBC) approach. This has the advantage that values are more realistic but the trade-off is 
that calculations become more complex [7]. 
Furthermore, this interconnection capacity has to be available in the right direction. A positive 
imbalance cannot be exchanged if there is no interconnection capacity left in the direction to the 
control area with a negative imbalance. So depending on the directions of the imbalance volumes, the 
capacity of import or export direction is taken into account to calculate the netting potential.  
The cost savings for the TSOs depend on the sign on their imbalance volumes: 
1. TSO with negative imbalance: this TSO will save costs thanks to reducing the need to activate 
reserves. Therefore, the cost savings will be based on their price for upward regulation. 
2. TSO with positive imbalance: the savings for this TSO depend on the sign of the price for 
downward regulation. Usually, the price is positive meaning that the TSO earns money by 
asking suppliers to regulate downwards. As suppliers will have less fuel costs, they want to pay 
money to the TSO in order to produce less. In this case, netting the imbalance will remove this 
payment and thus reduce revenue for the TSO. Therefore, the TSO has negative cost savings 
from the imbalance netting in this case. However, there are occasions where the downwards 
regulation price is negative, meaning that the TSO has to pay the supplier. In this case, the TSO 
has a positive cost saving. 
To assign cost savings to the netting potential, this netting potential is multiplied with the saved costs 
from avoiding activation of reserves, i.e. the opportunity costs. To achieve a fair spread of the savings, 
the IGCC settlement price is used to determine side payments for the financial settlement of these 
cross-border exchanges [18]. This settlement price is calculated by taking the volume-weighted 
average of the opportunity prices of the participating countries [18]. Therefore, in the case of a TSO 
who will lose money due to imbalance netting, their loss will be offset by the settlement. 
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4  Model description 
4.1  Objective 
The model studies the imbalance netting potential and cost savings between Belgium and the 
Netherlands for the full year of 2015. Furthermore, interconnection capacity has been taken into 
account. The goal of this model is to check the differences between theoretical possible imbalance 
netting and the real netting that has occurred. Furthermore, the importance of sufficient 
interconnection capacity is tested by comparing the savings of the different scenarios.  
4.2  Scenarios 
Five main scenarios are presented in this paper (Table 1). The difference in the scenarios lies in two 
aspects: the interconnection capacity and the reliability limit. For the interconnection capacity, in the 
first three scenarios, this is set at the Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) at ID to get a realistic figure. 
For the last two scenarios, an upfront reservation of capacity is imposed. This means that there will 
always be a part on the interconnection available for balancing purposes. This number changes from 
0 to 400 MW in case 4 and 0 to 150 MW in case 5. The reason for this difference in those two case is 
that the reliability limit will cause reservations of more than 150 MW to be redundant. 
Case number Interconnection capacity 
(MW) 
Reliability limit (MW) 
1 (real IGCC data) ATC 150 
2 ATC 150 
3 ATC / 
4 Reserving capacity (0-400 MW) / 
5 Reserving capacity (0-150 MW) 150 
Table 1 Overview of scenarios 
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For Belgium, the reliability limit is set on 140 MW, although this limit is not completely fixed and the 
data1 shows an imbalance netting limit of 150 MW [18]. Therefore, the same limit of 150 MW is used 
in this paper for the respective scenarios. Furthermore, the limit for the Netherlands is higher at 300 
MW so setting the limit at 150 MW will not be a problem. As this poses a rather strict constraint on 
the model, this constraint is removed for scenarios 3 and 4. Thus, it can be seen how this constraint 
affects imbalance netting. 
Scenario 1 is a special case as here real data of IGCC exchanges is used and thus the model does not 
decide whether or not imbalances can be netted. This scenario is introduced to show the difference 
between the model and reality. 
4.3  Data inputs and assumptions 
Imbalance volume data is taken from the websites of the respective TSOs. For the Belgian imbalances, 
the System Imbalance2 is used while for the Netherlands, the Settled Imbalances3 are used [21].  
aFRR prices are considered in the calculations as cost savings arise from dismissing activation of aFRR. 
For Belgium, the activated energy prices for aFRR2 are used; for the Netherlands, the bid price ladder 
for 100 MWh4 is used. The settlement payments are based on the IGCC settlement price. In Belgium, 
this price is calculated as a quantity weighted average of the offered aFRR prices [18]. Therefore, the 
aFRR price is used to calculate the side-payments in this paper. Furthermore, the aFRR price in Belgium 
was the same as the IGCC price for every QH in 20152. 
                                                            
1 Elia, “Data Download Page,” 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.elia.be/en/grid-data/data-download. 
[Accessed: 13-Sep-2016]. 
2 Elia, “Data Download Page,” 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.elia.be/en/grid-data/data-download. 
[Accessed: 13-Sep-2016]. 
3 TenneT, “Balans-delta met prijzen,” 2016. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.tennet.org/bedrijfsvoering/Systeemgegevens_uitvoering/Systeembalans_informatie/BalansDeltap
lusPrijzen.aspx. [Accessed: 14-Sep-2016]. 
4 TenneT, “Biedprijsladder balanshandhaving,” 2016. [Online]. Available: 
http://energieinfo.tennet.org/Maintenance/RVVBidPriceLadder.aspx?language=nl-NL. [Accessed: 15-Sep-2016]. 
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The cost savings presented in this paper relate to the costs from activation of reserves. There are also 
the payments from and to the TSO from the Balance Responsibility Parties (BRP). However, these costs 
are out of the scope of this paper. 
For the interconnection between Belgium and the Netherlands, the ATC5 was used. These values are 
the ones during ID trading. This gives a more realistic view of the resting interconnection capacity 
available for balancing purposes than taking NTC values which are commonly used in previous similar 
studies. Also, the calculations are easier than for FBMC data. Therefore, the usage of ATC is viewed as 
a trade-off between the other NTC and FMBC. This does not mean that the ATC method is considered 
better than the others. However, it is interesting to see what the influence is of another method on 
the results. 
For the real scenario (scenario 1), IGCC exchanged volumes data is also used in the model. The data on 
volumes for IGCC originate from the Belgian TSO6. As the data was from 2015 and France only joined 
IGCC in 2016, all the data for Belgium is related to the Dutch border, as Belgium only has 
interconnections with France and the Netherlands [18].  
5  Results 
First, the comparison of scenario 2 (ATC values) and scenario 5 (reserving interconnection capacity)  is 
shown in Table 2. Here, the reliability limit is still imposed with a limit of 150 MW. Therefore, there is 
no reason to reserve more than 150 MW as this can never be used. 
  
                                                            
5 TenneT, “Beschikbare transportcapaciteit Intraday,” 2016. [Online]. Available: 
http://energieinfo.tennet.org/Connection/ATCIntradayCountry.aspx. [Accessed: 20-Sep-2016]. 












ATC (scenario 2) €  3,265,346.70 €  1,142,022.67  €  4,407,369.37  
Reservation of  
60 MW (scenario 5) 
€  5,453,334.31 €     453,328.07  €  5,906,662.39  
Reservation of  
150 MW (scenario 5) 
€  6,442,168.77 €     102,938.94  €  6,545,107.71  
Table 2 Results of ATC versus reserving interconnection with aFRR limit 
As interconnection capacity rises, savings for Belgium rise. These results are in line with what was 
expected: more capacity means more imbalance netting possibilities and thus more cost savings. 
However, for the Netherlands this is not true. Increasing the interconnection capacity will reduce the 
savings for it. An explanation for this can be that in times of no interconnection availability, the Dutch 
imbalances are rather positive than negative and they receive money from their own suppliers. By 
reserving interconnection capacity, the Netherlands will now transfer the imbalance to Belgium and 
they may receive less money in return. However, the total savings still rise so this is better for society 
but may induce new side payments from Belgium to the Netherlands. 
Second, there is the case where the reliability limit is removed. Here, increasing reserved capacity over 
150 MW is a valid option as now the full amount of imbalances can be netted, taking into account the 
remaining interconnection capacity. The results can be seen in Table 3. Again, the results rise for 
Belgium with rising interconnection reservation. And for the Netherlands, the savings drop significantly 
when more capacity is reserved so for this there is no difference between the case with and without 













ATC (scenario 3) €  3,369,973.76  €  1,173,887.20  €  4,543,860.96  
Reservation of  
100 MW (scenario 4) 
€  6,230,880.11  €     248,852.06  €  6,479,732.17  
Reservation of  
200 MW (scenario 4) 
€  6,609,706.92  €     118,306.80  €  6,728,013.72  
Reservation of  
300 MW (scenario 4) 
€  6,626,947.01  €     116,516.87  €  6,743,463.88  
Reservation of  
400 MW (scenario 4) 
€  6,626,470.01  €     117,581.87  €  6,744,051.88  
Table 3 Results of ATC versus reserving interconnection without aFRR limit 
The complete results for this scenario are illustrated in Figure 2. This shines a light on another 
interesting result. The total savings flatten out and this starts at around 150 MW of reserved capacity, 
which is also the reliability limit for cross-border exchange of balancing reserves. Therefore, the 
importance of this aFRR limit while discussing imbalance netting can be viewed as rather low: the extra 
cost savings from removing this limit are minor. Taking this limit as the limit for the reservation, there 
is still an improvement of almost 50% compared to no reservation at all. 
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Cost savings also differ significantly across several months (Figure 3). For two months, January and July, 
the savings for the Netherlands are negative. These months both have mostly negative imbalance 
volumes for Belgium and positive imbalance volumes for the Netherlands which causes savings to drop 
for the Netherlands. However, overall cost savings remain positive so there is still value for imbalance 
netting in these periods. 
 
Figure 3 Monthly comparison of cost savings 
Comparing the results from scenario 2 (realistic case) with scenario 1 (real case) gives a view on how 
the model compares with reality. There is a discrepancy in these numbers. The total amount of IGCC 
in real life is almost twice as much as would be expected from the model. A reason for this is that 
imbalance netting can only be applied for QH in this model while real IGCC can be applied every second 
[18]. Therefore, while the imbalances for a specific second in a specific QH can be opposite and thus 
netting can be applied, this will not always be the case for that specific QH while aggregated which 
explains this discrepancy. 
6  Conclusion and future work 
Balancing reserves play a crucial part in stabilising future power systems. The exchange of these 
reserves in the several phases of the balancing market could result in significant cost savings. This 
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paper shows that increasing the interconnection capacity for imbalance netting will not yield the same 
results for all participants. However, the total cost savings always increase which opens up the 
opportunity of side-payments. These total cost savings can rise with about 50%.  
As only the benefits on the balancing market are considered here, future work could focus on the 
impact of reserving this interconnection upfront and thus not being able to use this capacity for the 
DA market. This will result in a loss of profit in the DA market. Therefore, this present an opportunity 
to search the optimal trade-off between the usage of interconnection capacity for DA and the 
balancing market. Further research can also focus on other modules of the IGCC collaboration and 
what the impact of interconnection is on these. 
Taking into account the results of this paper, interconnection capacity is confirmed as a vital part of 
cross-border balancing. This will provide opportunities to further enhance the efficiency of a European 
wide electricity market. 
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